Technology, Property Rights in Information, and Securities Regulation by Mahoney, Paul G.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 75 
Issue 2 Markets and Information Gathering in an Electronic Age: Securities Regulation in the 
21st Century 
January 1997 
Technology, Property Rights in Information, and Securities 
Regulation 
Paul G. Mahoney 
University of Virginia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the 
Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Information, and Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 
815 (1997). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss2/5 
This F. Hodge O'Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the 
Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
TECHNOLOGY, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
INFORMATION, AND SECURITIES REGULATION
PAUL G. MAHONEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
It seems logical that advances in information technology ("IT") would
have a profound impact on the regulation of securities markets. The securities
industry is a voracious consumer of IT innovations, and those innovations
often lead to changes in the way securities transactions are negotiated,
executed, cleared and settled. Surely, then, the regulatory system should
evolve at a similarly rapid pace in order to keep up with the industry it
regulates.
Over the past decade, academics, legislators, and regulators have declared
that the regulatory system must change in fundamental ways to reflect the
transformative effect of technology on securities markets.' The case for such
change is buttressed by developments in securities markets that threaten to
make the functional categories recognized by the regulatory system obsolete.
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has recently had to
decide, for example, whether a company that creates a computer bulletin
board on which investors can indicate an interest in buying or selling stock
should be subject to regulation as an exchange, a broker-dealer or an
investment adviser under the Securities Act of 1934, or should be viewed as
making an offer of the stock subject to registration under the Securities Act of
1933.2 Some predict a future in which computer networks take the place of
exchanges and broker-dealers.3
* Professor of Law and Albert C. BeVier Research Professor, University of Virginia School of
Law. I thank Larry Harris and Mark Weinstein for helpful discussions.
1. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (1990)
[hereinafter ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS]; Stephen M.H. Wallman, Regulating in a World of
Technological and Global Change, Remarks Before the Institute of International Bankers (March 4,
1996).
2. Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter [current transfer binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 77,226 (June 24, 1996); see Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78f, 78o
(1994); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1994).
3. See, e.g., Leslie Eaton, Slow Transition for Investing: Stock Market Meets Internet, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1996, atAl.
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While securities markets and securities regulation have changed as a result
of new technologies, these changes are not revolutionary. Most trading still
takes place through the traditional intermediaries, most public offerings still
take place through underwriters, and the regulatory system retains its
underlying premise that these intermediaries will be involved. The basic
principles and methods of the mandatory disclosure system look the same as
they did a decade or more ago. The question, then, is whether the SEC and
the markets it regulates have been too slow to react to the.remarkable
advances in IT, or whether the implications of those advances for securities
trading and securities regulation are more limited than they might appear at
first glance.
My thesis is that the latter explanation is more accurate. This Article will
support that thesis by making three observations about the impact of
technology on securities markets and securities regulation. First, the cost of
transmitting, storing and manipulating data is a very minor component of the
social cost of mandatory corporate disclosure; therefore, the welfare effects of
mandatory disclosure are not very sensitive to advances in IT. Second, the
traditional intermediaries of securities markets, such as brokers, dealers, and
exchanges, serve a variety of purposes besides matching buyers and sellers.
They also lend their reputations, credit and expertise to market participants.
Computer networks can do a good job of helping buyers and sellers find one
another, but it is too early to tell whether they can also perform these
additional functions at a lower cost than human intermediaries. Third,
advances in IT are unlikely to eliminate informational asymmetries in the
securities markets directly through the transmission of data to traders; instead,
they will alleviate asymmetries indirectly by making arbitrage more effective
and prices more informative. In other words, technology will not change the
relative proportions of public and private information in securities markets,
but it will increase the speed with which prices adjust to private information.
Regulatory change cannot, therefore, be premised on the notion that
technology will make traders more nearly homogeneously informed.
What, then, are the implications of IT for securities regulation? As
technology improves it will become increasingly obvious when the regulatory
system is trying to do too much. In particular, technology is helping to expose
the limits of the regulatory system's ability to eliminate informational
asymmetries in securities markets. A more realistic goal would be to facilitate
transactions despite these asymmetries. This can often be accomplished
simply by clarifying which party has the right to profit from particular types
of information and permitting other parties to adjust prices accordingly. In
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some circumstances, facilitating transactions without a more intrusive
approach is difficult-for example, when one party has explicitly or
implicitly agreed to use its information for the benefit of another. Securities
law, then, should be understood as a law of property rights in information.
The central function of regulators4 should be to assure that those property
rights are clearly delineated, understood, and enforced.
Part II discusses the (modest) implications of IT for the design of the
mandatory disclosure system. Part Ill outlines in summary form some of the
many functions of intermediaries in securities markets and argues that it is not
yet clear how well automated systems can replicate these functions. Part IV
demonstrates how new technologies can increase as well as decrease
asymmetries in information among traders and therefore will not reduce the
importance of informed trading. Having thus argued that IT has fewer
implications than might be imagined for securities regulation, Part V contends
that the ongoing reduction in the cost of manipulating information will force
regulators to focus their attention on their core mission, which is to facilitate
securities transactions despite the informational barriers to trade. Part VI
concludes.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND DISCLOSURE
Advances in communications technology continuously reduce the costs of
storing, retrieving, transmitting and otherwise manipulating a given amount
of data. In that sense, these advances also reduce the cost of disclosure. The
implications of that reduction seem obvious. Assume for the sake of argument
that private actors seek to match the marginal private benefits and costs of
disclosure and that regulators seek to match marginal social benefits and
costs. All other things being equal, reducing the cost of disclosure leads to
more disclosure. Indeed, such cost reductions make feasible changing the
mandatory disclosure system to one of continuous disclosure, in which
corporate developments are disclosed at low cost as soon as they occur.5
That is fine so far as it goes. The cost of transmitting data to regulators and
investors, however, is only one component of the cost of disclosure. Two
other important components are what I will call opportunity cost and liability
4. My focus will be only on the substance of rules on matters such as disclosure and market
structure, not on who should set them. For a discussion of the latter point, see Paul G. Mahoney, The
Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 1997).
5. See Langevoort, supra note 1.
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cost. Opportunity cost is the difference between the value of the information
to the company if kept secret and its value to the company if publicly
disclosed. Many forms of corporate information are more valuable if they are
kept secret. Obvious examples include trade secrets, ideas for new products,
plans to enter new markets, and similar information that competitors could
use. There are also less obvious examples. A company may have contracts
with other firms pursuant to which both parties have made project-specific
investments. Those investments give each firm market power vis-A-vis the
other.6 In that situation, information about Party B's valuation of the contract
can enable Party A to gain a greater share of the gains from trade, and vice
versa. Thus, any given company at any given time likely has a considerable
amount of internal information that would, if made public, result in wealth
transfers from the company to its competitors, suppliers or customers.
Disclosure of corporate information also carries the risk of liability.
Liability under the SEC's principal antifraud provision, Rule lOb-5,7 requires
an intentional or reckless misstatement,8 but courts May err in determining the
defendant's state of mind. Liability will therefore sometimes attach to
statements that were not intentionally or recklessly misleading ex ante, but
merely incorrect ex post. Any corporate disclosure-even though made in
good faith and after appropriate verification efforts-therefore carries with it
a price tag. The price, or expected liability, is a function of the probability that
the statement will turn out to be incorrect, the probability that a court will
erroneously find that the statement was intentionally or recklessly false given
that it is incorrect, and the expected damage award.
Opportunity cost and liability cost are important determinants of the scope
of the mandatory disclosure system.' This can be seen by looking at the
SEC's disclosure rules as embodied in its Regulation S-K.' As a heuristic
device, we might think of the mandatory disclosure system as an industry in
which firms produce and sell information to consumers, such as investors and
analysts, under the direction of a central planner (regulator) that sets
minimum production levels and prices. The industry is in a stable, long-run
6. See generally Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
7. Securities Exchange Act rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
8. Ernst & Emstv. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,212-14(1976).
9. The notion that issuers' desires to keep information secret and to avoid liability constrain the
mandatory disclosure system is explored in detail in Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of
Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOKLYN L. REv. 763 (1995).
10. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10- .915 (1996).
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equilibrium that is apparently satisfactory to all affected parties because none
is putting substantial pressure on Congress or the SEC to make fundamental
changes. The characteristics of that equilibrium are worth examining
carefully.
There is a set of information that must be disclosed. That set consists
principally of factual, historical data and commentary on that data. The
information is disclosed only episodically, primarily at the end of each fiscal
quarter, and the disclosures are built around the annual or quarterly financial
statements. In order to provide time for financial statement preparation, the
disclosures are made with delay-ninety days in the case of Form 10-K, filed
at the end of the fiscal year, and forty-five days in the case of Form 10-Q,
filed at the end of the other three fiscal quarters.'
All of these features reduce the liability cost of the disclosures. Factual,
historical information can be verified objectively. Delay provides an
opportunity for accountants, lawyers and managers to check and recheck the
information. With sufficient effort, the liability cost associated with a
company's Form 1O-K or IO-Q can be made acceptably small.
The design of the disclosure system also mitigates the opportunity cost of
the required periodic disclosures. To begin, the issuer is not required to
disclose nonpublic information about products in the development phase or
other information about the status of a particular line of business "the
disclosure of which would affect adversely the registrant's competitive
position."" Also significant is the fact that the heart of the required
disclosures is accounting data. The firm's revenues and expenses as shown in
its financial statements aggregate a large number of transactions, and the
managers who prepare them have considerable discretion over how to present
information. These features make it difficult for competitiors to use financial
statements to discover which parts of the firm's operations are most
profitable. While the SEC requires separate financial information for each
business segment, managers can define segments and allocate expenses
among them in such a way as to mask competitively sensitive information. 3
Because extracting detailed information about the company's operations from
the financial statements is difficult, the opportunity cost of such disclosures is
11. See General Instruction A, Form 10-K, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Regs. & Forms (CCII) 33,251, at
33,205 (1996); General Instruction A, Form 10-Q, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Regs. & Forms (CCII) 33,221, at
33,195 (1996).
12. Regulation S-K, Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(ii) (1996).
13. Seeid. §229.101(b)&app.A.
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low.
By contrast, both the opportunity cost and the liability cost associated with
management's beliefs or plans about the future can be high. A firm's
competitors would want to know that the firm plans to enter a new market or
change a particular strategy, or that it is making certain assumptions about
future market conditions. Further, compared to historical statements,
statements about the future are much more likely to be wrong. Companies are
not generally required to disclose forward-looking information, which avoids
potentially large opportunity and liability costs.
There is no easy way to reduce the opportunity cost of forward-looking
statements. Liability cost, by contrast, can be reduced by adopting a more
lenient liability standard. Both the SEC and Congress adopted this strategy
when each decided to try to encourage (but not require) more disclosure of
forward-looking information. Each adopted a safe harbor rule declaring that
forward-looking statements that meet defined standards are nonfraudulent. 4
The safe harbor that Congress included in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 is interesting in that coverage of the safe harbor often
turns on a fairly objective question-whether the statement was accompanied
by "meaningful cautionary statements."' 5 A company can therefore determine
ex ante with reasonable accuracy whether a particular statement will qualify
for the safe harbor, thereby reducing the liability cost of the statement. In that
event, why not mandate forward-looking disclosures? The likely reason is
that these disclosures are still much more costly than the mandated
disclosures, and the difference is principally a function of opportunity cost.
Mandated disclosures are not exclusively factual and historical. To a
limited extent, the SEC's requirement for a "Management's Discussion and
Analysis" in prospectuses and periodic reports forces management to
speculate about whether existing "trends" in earnings and other key
accounting variables will continue. 6 The SEC's enforcement behavior,
14. See Securities Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1996) (safe harbor for
forward-looking statements in documents filed with the SEC or in an annual report to shareholders,
except for statements made without a reasonable basis or disclosed in bad faith); see also Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 102, 109 Stat. 737, 753-56 (codified
as § 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5 (Supp. 11995)).
15. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E(c)(A)(I), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-S(c)(A)(i) (Supp. I
1995).
16. See Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (1996) (calling for a "Management's
discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations"). This narrative discussion of
the company's financial performance is required to discuss "known trends" and "uncertainties"
regarding its operations and short-term and long-term cash sources and uses. Id. § 229.303(a)(1)-(3).
0
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however, seems to indicate that the point of the exercise is to pressure
companies to give their shareholders advance warning of earnings downturns
whenever possible. 7 Courts, moreover, have been sensitive to opportunity
cost. A district court recently rejected the notion that the obligation to discuss
"known trends or uncertainties" in the Management's Discussion and
Analysis section of Form 10-K required a retailer to disclose a new strategy
of discounting its products in order to gain market share (a strategy that
proved unsuccessful)." The court's analysis is attuned to the problems
discussed above:
More importantly, courts have been sensitive about forcing a company
to damage its own interests as well as those of its shareholders by
revealing competitive information. It is inherently absurd to impose on
companies in highly competitive, consumer-based industries an
affirmative duty to disclose to competitors sensitive pricing and
marketing decisions. It would defy reason (and long-established
business practices) to interpret a regulation concerned with analyzing
"operations" and "financial condition" and furnishing a "narrative
form of the financial data" as requiring such disclosure. S-K 303's
mandate to disclose material "trends and uncertainties" does not
contemplate furnishing competitors with an analytical blueprint of a
company's business strategies.' 9
Thus, the limited forward-looking information required in the
"Management's Discussion and Analysis" section of Form 10-K or in a new-
issue prospectus does not significantly raise the opportunity cost associated
The accompanying instructions state, "Registrants are encouraged, but not required, to supply forward-
looking information. This is to be distinguished from presently known data which will impact upon
future operating results, such as known future increases in costs of labor or materials. This latter data
may be required to be disclosed." Id. instruction 7.
17. This seems clear from the SEC's principal enforcement action involving a faulty
Management's Discussion and Analysis. See In re Caterpillar Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30532,
1992 SEC LEXIS 786 (March 31, 1992). In the spring of 1990, the management of Caterpillar Inc.
warned its board of directors about a likely fall in the earnings of its Brazilian subsidiary, and a
resulting fall in Caterpillar's consolidated earnings, because of the effects of hyperinflation in Brazil.
Id. at *4-*9. The company did not, however, include this information in the Management's Discussion
and Analysis section of its Form 10-K or 10-Q. Id. at *11-*12. When it became aware of these facts,
the SEC brought an enforcement action against Caterpillar, resulting in a negotiated settlement in
which Caterpillar agreed to improve its compliance with Item 303. For a discussion of the Caterpillar
case, see Kitch, supra note 9, at 803-16.
18. In re Canandaigua Sec. Litig., 944 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
19. Id. at 1211 (citations omitted).
1997]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
with mandatory disclosures.
The basic outline of the mandatory disclosure system as I have described
it-one in which disclosures are primarily factual, historical, episodic, and
delayed-has remained constant for decades. Were the overall costs and
benefits of mandatory disclosure sensitive to the cost of transmitting
information, one would surely have seen dramatic change by now, either in
disclosure rules or in the voluntary disclosure practices of firms. Technology
has, in recent years, opened up myriad possibilities for more timely and useful
disclosure. Companies could, for example, set up web sites with hyperlinks to
a vast array of the company's internal information. Investors could then find
out about the status of inventories, orders, customer returns and bad debts on
a real-time, or slightly delayed, basis. Investors could be nearly as well-
informed as top management about any aspects of the company's
performance that could be readily reduced to numbers.
We have seen nothing of the sort. One might offer the standard arguments
against such an innovation-it would result in "information overload," or it
would mislead investors, who would be unable to appreciate the difference
between raw data and polished financial statements. But these arguments are
makeweights. Buy-side analysts spend their time trying to uncover precisely
these types of data. Companies do not disclose this data because the private
costs of disclosure exceed the private benefits. Because we know that the cost
of transmitting the data is insubstantial, there must be other costs to consider.
Opportunity and liability costs are the most likely candidates.
IT might affect opportunity and liability cost in addition to the cost of
manipulating information. The direction and magnitude of such effects,
however, are not easy to predict. For example, the growing availability of
prospectuses, 10-Ks, and so on through on-line services facilitates searches by
would-be plaintiffs and their lawyers for particular disclosures made by
particular companies. Liability costs may therefore increase because it is
easier to identify disclosures that subsequent events have proven incorrect.
On the other hand, technology may also improve the efficiency of defense
counsel in responding to "fishing expedition" lawsuits. Similarly unclear is
whether technology gives an edge to the person who wants to find out
someone else's secret or the person who wants to keep the secret.
In sum, technology reduces the cost of manipulating data, which is a small
component of the social cost of mandatory disclosure. The effect of
technology on the important social costs of mandatory disclosure-opportunity
cost and liability cost-is neither systematic nor necessarily large. On the
whole, there is no reason to predict that IT has dramatic implications for the
[VOL. 75:815
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design or scope of the mandatory disclosure system.
III. TECHNOLOGY AND INTERMEDIATION
The central institutional feature of securities markets is intermediation.
The most visible intermediaries are broker-dealers, exchanges, investment
companies, and investment advisors. Broker-dealers play various roles,
sometimes acting as agent for a buyer or seller, other times acting as
principal. When acting as principal, a dealer may participate in the market
sporadically or quote two-way prices continuously as a market-maker or
specialist.
Intermediaries make markets more liquid, but they do so at a cost
represented by a broker's commission and a dealer's bid-ask spread. It is a
common phenomenon in markets in which middlemen play an important role
for producers and consumers to believe that the middlemen are earning
excessive profits in relation to the benefits they provide, and to seek ways to
avoid them. Securities markets are no different. Commentators have seized
upon technology as a potential substitute for intermediaries. 0 They observe
that brokers, dealers and exchanges exist to reduce search costs by matching
sellers of securities with buyers. The dramatic reduction in search costs made
possible by modem communications technology should permit buyers and
sellers to find one another without the help of an intermediary.
Communication networks have started to compete with intermediaries, but
overall, intermediaries remain very important. Let us first consider new-issue
markets. The costs of intermediation seem particularly high in these markets.
Fixed-price underwritings are costly and initial public offerings appear to be
systematically underpriced, so the potential benefits of technology should be
great. Commentators have therefore focused on how technology could help
issuers of securities reach the investing public without relying on
underwriters.21
A few small companies, beginning with Spring Street Brewery, have used
the Internet to market their stock, typically in amounts too small to require
registration under the Securities Act.2 The examples to date, however, look
20. The idea is by no means new. See, e.g., Fischer Black, Toward a Fully Automated Stock
Exchange (pts. I & 2), FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1971, at 29, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 1971,
at 25. For a more recent discussion, see MARTIN MAYER, STEALING THE MARKET 109-42 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 1, at 754-57,765-78.
22. See Stephanie Gruner, When Mom and Pop Go Public, INC., Dec. 1996, at 66, 70.
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more like amusing novelties than the leading edge of finance. Direct public
offerings (that is, offerings that do not use intermediaries) over the Internet
look remarkably similar to direct public offerings that do not use the Internet:
they generally involve small companies, raising a few hundred thousand
dollars mostly from customers and employees.23 Starting in 1996, there have
been some larger offerings over the Internet, but these were done through
underwriters or placement agents, with the Internet used simply as a more
efficient (or perhaps more eye-catching) means of getting the prospectus or
offering circular into the hands of investors and investors' indications of
interest back to the selling agent or underwriter.24
The story is somewhat different in secondary markets. There has been a
proliferation of automated trading systems in which buyers and sellers
transmit orders through a computer terminal, and the system executes trades
without interaction between buyers and sellers or their agents. A survey in
1993 identified over fifty such systems worldwide.' Many of these, however,
cannot be viewed as direct competitors to traditional exchanges because they
are operated by traditional exchanges and represent a means of handling
orders (particularly small orders) more rapidly.
For example, several of the regional exchanges in the United States
operate automated trading systems in which small market orders (that is,
orders to buy or sell at the market price) are automatically executed at the best
current price, sometimes after exposure to the specialist, who may execute the
transaction at a better price.26 Public investors, however, cannot simply log on
and enter orders. Direct access is typically limited to exchange members or
others who have access to the trading floor, and customers therefore deal
directly with a broker and pay commissions.27
A few automated systems are proprietary trading systems ("PTSs"), which
means they are not owned by exchanges and are not regulated as exchanges.
Examples are Instinet, POSIT, and the Arizona Stock Exchange (formerly the
Wunsch auction system). Some are passive trading systems in which
institutional investors may trade after the close of the primary market (the
23. See id. at 66-68.
24. See After Much Talk, On-Line IPOs Begin to See Action, GOING PUBLIC-THE IPO
REPORTER, Nov. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws file; Linda Himelstein & Leah
Nathans Spira, The Net Hits the Big Time, BUS. WK., Oct. 28, 1996, at 142.
25. See Ian Domowitz, A Taxonomy ofAutomated Trade Execution Systems, 12 J. INT'L MONEY
& FIN. 607, 609, 610-13 tbls. 1-3 (1993).
26. See id. at 617-20; see also ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 1, at 49-50.
27. See Domowitz, supra note 25, at 617.
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NYSE, ASE or NASDAQ) at the closing price on that market The advantage
of such a system is low transaction costs compared to trading on the primary
market through a broker. For example, Instinet's Crossing Network charges a
commission of one cent per share, with discounts for very large orders." By
contrast, the most sophisticated institutions often pay their brokers a
commission ranging from four to six cents per share.2
The passive networks take prices from a primary market; they have no
independent price discovery mechanism. Other computerized networks set
prices endogenously through a continuous computerized auction, a periodic
single-price auction, or some variation on these themes.30 These systems
come closest to the vision of a world without traditional intermediaries. They
could in theory function as the principal trading market for a security, and
investors could gain direct access to the market without using a broker.
Indeed, the Arizona Stock Exchange has announced plans for an Internet-
based "exchange" for small-capitalization companies that otherwise lack a
public market.3
On balance, however, automation has not displaced human intermediaries
to an extent remotely resembling what is technically feasible. Most traders
still gain access to the market through a broker, and traditional markets still
attract the lion's share of trading volume. As Fischer Black observed in 1989
in describing the use of new technology on stock exchanges, futures
exchanges, and NASDAQ, "In all of them, some kind of automation is
essential, but in none of them is automation the key to the market. None of
them ... would we describe as automated markets, yet they are all very
Successful.
' 32
The essential question is whether the "unimaginative, tradition-bound
practices ' 3D of these intermediaries stem from market or regulatory failures or
28. See Jia Ye, Market Fragmentation: An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship Between
Electronic Crossing Networks and Primary Markets (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Southern California).
29. See Alyssa L. Lappen, The Cost ofInefficiency, INST'L INVESTOR, Mar. 1995, at 60, 65-66.
30. See Ian Domowitz, An Exchange is a Many-Splendored Thing: The Classification and
Regulation of Automated Trading Systems, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION OF
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 93-123 (Andrew W. Lo ed., 1996).
31. See New Stock Exchange Planned for the Net, FIN. NETNEWS, Sept. 23, 1996, at 2.
32. Fischer Black, Does Technology Matter?, in CENTER FOR REG. ON INFO. SYS. & SALOMON
BROS. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF FIN. INST., THE CHALLENGE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOR THE
SECURITIES MARKETS 151, 151 (Henry C. Lucas, Jr. & Robert A. Schwartz eds., 1989).
33. See Saul Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645, 667
(1984).
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instead serve some valuable but nonobvious ends. The instinct of
policymakers has been to focus on the first of these explanations.34 They
suggest that the integration of technology into securities markets is a
regulatory problem. The traditional markets are excessively attached to old
ways of doing things, and their intransigence can delay innovation.35
Regulatory structures created with exchange markets in mind may
unwittingly exacerbate the problem.
It is hard to make a convincing argument that regulation is an important
factor holding back innovative uses of technology in U.S. securities markets.
Given the strong incentives for regulators to be risk-averse, the SEC has been
surprisingly accommodating toward computerized trading systems. Although
the statutory definition of an "exchange" could be read to encompass most
PTSs,36 the SEC has chosen to take a less stringent approach.37 Instinet and
POSIT take the position that they are not exchanges and are not required to
register as such, a view the SEC has declined to challenge.38 The SEC
determined that the Arizona Stock Exchange is an exchange but granted it an
exemption from registration on the basis of its low trading volume.39 The
34. The Brady Report that followed the 1987 market break, for example, argued that automated
systems performed poorly in that episode because the resistance of market makers to automation
precluded more effective system design. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET
MECHANISMS, at VI-52 to VI-53 (1988); see also DIVISION OF MKT. REG., U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK (1988). Similar conclusions were echoed in a
subsequent Office of Technology Assessment study. See ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note
1, at 61-62.
35. See SEC Rel. No. 34-38672, 62 Fed. Reg. 40316 (June 18, 1997), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,942 [hereinafter Concept Release] (referring to exchanges' "tendency to try to
discourage innovation in order to protect existing practices").
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1994).
37. See DIVISION OF MKT. REG., SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF
CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS, at 1I- 12 (1994) [hereinafter MARKET 2000].
38. See Instinet Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC No-Act LEXIS 1 (Sept 8, 1986)
POSIT, SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 108131 (July 28, 1987); see also Instinet Real-Time Trading
Serv., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act LEXIS 52 (Jan. 21, 1997) (confirming that Instinet's
real-time trading system is an "electronic communications network" rather than an exchange).
39. See Wunsch Auction Sys., Inc., Order Granting Limited Volume Exemption from
Registration as an Exchange Under Section 5 of the Securities Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-28899, 1991 SEC LEXIS 283 (Feb. 20, 1991). For a summary of the functional issues at stake
in deciding whether to regulate a trading network as an exchange, see Ian Domowitz, The
Classification and Regulation ofAutomated Trading systems, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND
REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, supra note 30.
Until very recently, the SEC had very limited authority to exempt from registration a trading
system that met the statutory definition of an exchange. The principal ground for exemption was
limited volume. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1994). However, the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified
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SEC has also tried to accommodate public offerings over the Internet by
permitting delivery of prospectuses through a web site.40
Not only has the SEC not stood in the way of the PTSs, but the exchanges
can argue (and have) that the PTSs are advantaged in not having to bear the
regulatory costs imposed on the regulated exchanges.4' There are direct costs
associated with SEC approval of stock exchange rules and other oversight
functions. There are also indirect costs associated with the decision to
categorize these trading systems as a service incidental to their proprietors'
broker-dealer businesses rather than as exchanges. One consequence is that
the PTSs can keep more information about transactions and orders secret than
can an exchange. Pursuant to section 1 1A of the Exchange Act and the SEC's
rules thereunder, regulated exchanges must join the institutions established to
create a National Market System, including a consolidated trade reporting
system and a consolidated quotation system.4" Under the latter, exchanges
must continuously collect and transmit to the consolidated quotation system
the current best bid and offer of any member broker or dealer along with the
size of such bid or offer.43 Broker-dealers, by contrast, are obligated seek the
best price on behalf of a customer but not to expose customer orders to any
particular market'
The difference may matter to institutional investors and other large
traders. Following a standard convention, we may consider traders as falling
into two categories-informed and uninformed. Uninformed, or liquidity,
traders are those whose sales and purchases are prompted by the desire to
consume or save, respectively.4' Informed traders trade in order to profit from
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm, 80b-3a), provided the SEC with broad general exemptive authority
under the Exchange Act, in part to enable the SEC to respond to technological change.
40. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 33-7233, 60
SEC Docket 1091 (Oct. 6, 1995).
41. For an argument that the SEC's desire to accommodate PTSs has produced an incoherent
approach to determining what an exchange is, see Ian Domowitz & Ruben Lee, The Legal Basis for
Stock Exchanges: The Classification and Regulation of Automated Trading Systems (1996) (working
paper).
42. See Securities Exchange Act § 1 A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (1994).
43. See Securities Exchange Act Rule I lAcl-l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAcl-l(b) (1996).
44. The SEC may be experiencing a change of heart In a Concept Release on the Regulation of
Exchanges published after the symposium at which this Article was presented, the SEC expressed its
concern over the differential treatment of automated trading systems and exchanges and suggested that
it may regulate the former more heavily as a means of ensuring greater transparency. See Concept
Release, supra note 35; see also infra text accompanying note 112.
45. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E. Verrecchia, Information Aggregation in a Noisy
Rational Expectations Economy, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 221, 234 (1981); Milton Harris & Arthur Raviv,
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private information relevant to the future return on a security.46 In a perfectly
competitive market, prices adjust only to the arrival of information. If market
makers and other traders can distinguish informed from liquidity traders,
liquidity trades (even large ones) will have no market impact, and informed
trades (even small ones) will have a market impact. In a less than perfectly
competitive market, large liquidity trades may have a transitory effect on
prices, but informed trades will have a permanent impact.
This provides informed traders with a substantial incentive to make
themselves indistinguishable from liquidity traders and market makers with a
substantial incentive to distinguish them. This simple analysis explains
several features of securities markets. Market makers are at an informational
disadvantage relative to informed traders, and part of the bid-ask spread
quoted by a market maker represents compensation for the resulting adverse
selection problem.47 Thus, all other things equal, the bid-ask spread becomes
wider when market makers perceive substantial information risk. So long as it
is difficult for market makers to differentiate informed from liquidity traders,
they will quote the same spread to each. Over time, liquidity traders will bear
some or all of the costs associated with informed trading in the form of larger
spreads.
This, in turn, leads liquidity traders to try to distinguish themselves from
informed traders. Order size and patience are important variables that may
signal the presence or absence of information. An informed trader wants to
trade in large quantities and to do so quickly. A small order, by contrast, will
likely be presumed uninformed (and, in any event, the cost to the market
maker of guessing wrong is small for a small order). This creates a dilemma
for large liquidity traders like mutual funds or pension funds, who must invest
cash inflows and liquidate securities to meet the cash needs of their
beneficiaries. Their large orders brand them as potential informed traders.
There are a number of strategies that a large but uninformed trader might
wish to follow. One is to trade baskets of securities rather than individual
securities in order to signal that the trade is not prompted by information
Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race, 6 REV. FIN. STUDIES 473,474 (1993).
46. See, e.g., Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315
(1985); Jeffrey F. Jaffe & Robert L. Winkler, Optimal Speculation Against an Efficient Market, J. FIN
49 (1979).
47. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist
Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 72 (1985).
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about any one security.48 Another is to break up the order into smaller pieces
to be executed over time. Patience distinguishes liquidity from informed
traders. Another strategy is to permit a potential counterparty or intermediary
to audit the trader's motives, perhaps by disclosing information about cash
inflows into the mutual fund or pension fund. The procedures for block
trading permit such auditing; the trades take place off the floor of the
exchange among self-selected intermediaries who can engage in direct, non-
anonymous negotiations with the block trader or its intermediary.49 The price
impact of these "upstairs" trades appears to be small compared to identically
sized trades negotiated solely on the exchange floor, which suggests that
uninformed traders are able to signal their motivations credibly in upstairs
negotiations."0
Another strategy for large traders is not to reveal the size of their order
until they believe they have a counterparty who is genuinely willing to trade.
Prematurely revealing order size may result in the market moving against the
large trader because other traders suspect informational motives or because
demand is not infinitely price-elastic. Intermediaries provide concealment; a
broker may reveal order size only when she is sure that the counterparty is
willing to trade.5 Of course, human intermediaries are imperfect, and the
broker may reveal too much too soon.
Automated trading systems provide another avenue for achieving
anonymity and concealing the size of an order until a serious counterparty is
found. On both Instinet and POSIT, a system participant may submit an order
and have no information other than the price disclosed to other market
participants.52 These systems match buy and sell orders with overlapping
prices on a price-priority basis without any negotiation or disclosure among
system participants. Thus, the size of an order is revealed only when the order
becomes an executed trade. Like human intermediaries, then, these crossing
networks help their customers to make large trades without causing adverse
price moves. They have the advantage of being able to attract a substantial
48. See Lawrence Harris, Consolidation, Fragmentation, Segmentation and Regulation, FIN.
MKTS., INSTS. & INSTRUS., Dec. 1993, at 1, 11-12.
49. See generally Kenneth Burdett & Maureen O'Hara, Building Blocks: An Introduction to
Block Trading, 11 J. BANKING & FIN. 193 (1987).
50. See Minder Cheng & Ananth Madhavan, In Search ofLiquidity: Block Trades in the Upstairs
and Downstairs Markets, 10 REV. FIN. STUDIES 175 (1997).
51. See Harris, supra note 48, at 6-7.
52. As to Instinet, see Ian Domowitz & Ruben Lee, supra note 41. As to crossing networks
generally, see Harris, supra note 48, at 7.
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order flow by virtue of their capacity for executing trades in-house.
Part of the advantage that automated networks have over exchanges,
therefore, has nothing to do with more effective technology. The advantage
comes from being able to merge the execution function that is typical of
exchanges with a broker-dealer's greater capacity under the regulatory regime
to withhold information. The reduced transparency of automated systems
compared to exchanges may enable uninformed traders to reduce the
transitory price impact of their trades compared to trading on an exchange
floor.53 Were automated networks regulated as exchanges, then the size of
submitted orders would be subject to disclosure. In that event, large
uninformed traders might forego automated systems in favor of traditional
intermediaries, who could search for counterparties in the upstairs market or
in an interdealer network while concealing the details of the order.
Given their regulatory and cost advantages, one might wonder why PTSs
have not captured even more of the total trading volume in securities markets,
and why they are not the primary market for many securities. Regulatory
barriers or successful attempts by exchanges to suppress competition are not
plausible sources of blame. The alternative explanation is that it is hard to
replicate all of the functions that intermediaries perform, and automated
systems have not yet mastered the task.
Reducing investors' search costs by helping buyers and sellers find one
another is only one of the economic functions of intermediaries, and not
necessarily the most important function. The rapidly growing literature on
intermediation, or market microstructure, provides important insights into
how intermediaries help to overcome the informational and strategic barriers
to trade.' For example, intermediaries guarantee clients' trades, thereby
facilitating exchange between traders who do not know one another; they
play an important role in setting prices; and they provide liquidity by holding
inventories and standing ready to buy or sell at their bid and ask prices,
respectively.
The persistence of intermediaries, therefore, may simply reflect their
success in reducing barriers to trade and setting prices. For example, the
paucity of direct public offerings over the Internet likely reflects the fact that
underwriters provide services beyond helping issuers find investors. Investors
53. See Ananth Madhavan, Security Prices and Market Transparency, 5 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION
255 (1996).
54. A nontechnical overview of this literature is contained in Daniel F. Spulber, Market
Microstructure and Intermediation, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 1996, at 135.
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appear to value the certification of quality that an underwriter provides, which
is a function that technology cannot replicate. Underwriters also play a central
role in determining the price of an initial public offering, a role that
technology cannot play by itself. I will not dwell on these reasons for the
continued presence of underwriters.5 Instead, I will turn to the continued
success of broker-dealers in trading markets.
Brokerage and transaction fees are not the only costs relevant to the
decision to use one trading system rather than another. Using any trading
system imposes an opportunity cost measured by the prices available in other
trading systems. A buyer will not be happy with a trading system that
provides direct access and thereby reduces transaction costs from six cents per
share to one cent per share but executes the purchase at a price one-eighth of a
point higher than that available in another market. Part of the service
intermediaries offer is to try to find the best price, in part by trying to reduce
as much as possible the price impact of the customer's order.
Automated trading systems can adopt one of two strategies. They may
decide to offer only a single service-inexpensive access-and not any of the
other services that traditional intermediaries offer. In that event, things will
likely continue as before, with traditional intermediaries remaining as
important participants in securities markets and automated systems capturing
specific and limited segments of the total order flow. Alternatively, automated
systems may attempt to provide the full range of services that intermediaries
provide. Providing more services will raise costs and pose some interesting
problems. I will identify a few of those problems here, but the list is intended
to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
First, consider the fact that automated systems would appear particularly
well-suited to small retail trades. Retail investors trade in such small
quantities that counterparts will not worry about information risk. Retail
investors should therefore be happy to expose their orders to any and all
interested parties over the widest communications networks. They should also
be willing to trade off immediacy (that is, the ability to execute a trade
quickly) for lower transaction costs. Those factors might lead one to predict
that low-cost, fully automated PTSs would capture a large share of the retail
market. Yet the automated trading systems set up for small trades are run by
55. These reasons were explored in depth by John C. Coffee, Jr., The Virtual Revolution: The
Case for a Painless Accomodation Between the SEC and the Intemet, Speech for Symposium at
Washington University School of Law (Mar. 14, 1997).
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exchanges rather than PTSs, which means that customers can obtain access
only through a broker.
Perhaps brokers have dissuaded exchanges from adopting fully automated
systems for retail customers in order to protect the brokers' business. On the
other hand, the fact that brokers continue to provide access for retail
customers may be a response to default risk. Traders sometimes fail to
perform their bargains, whether deliberately, inadvertently, or as a
consequence of insolvency. In a trading system in which all participants are
large, repeat-player institutions, the proprietor or other traders may be willing
to bear default risk. Retail investors, however, may need an intermediary to
stand in and guarantee the trade. Thus, the exchanges' automated small-order
execution systems require that an order be submitted by a member broker,
who guarantees the trade as it does for orders taken to the trading floor. An
automated trading system could deal with default risk by accepting orders
only to the extent the customer has sufficient cash or securities on deposit
with the proprietor, but this would of course raise the cost of running the
system.
Consider also the dilemma faced by a large institutional investor that has
submitted an order to an automated trading network. Assume that the order is
posted on a communications network and will be executed in the future
pursuant to some matching algorithm incorporating price priority. If the order
may not be freely withdrawn at any time prior to execution, then it is in effect
an option written to all other system participants. For example, an order to sell
at $30 per share will find immediate takers if the price of the same security in
some other market rises above $30. On the other hand, if the system
participants wish to avoid writing options, they must monitor market
conditions and update their orders accordingly; and the trading system must
facilitate such updating.
On the trading floor of an exchange, brokers do not create options because
they negotiate face-to-face, and an order is good only for so long as the
negotiations last. Market makers in dealer markets avoid the problem by
continuously updating their quotations in light of market conditions. In each
case, however, the intermediary must go to some effort to avoid creating
options. In markets that do not include traditional intermediaries, investors
themselves must play this role, at some cost to themselves, or incur the cost
associated with writing uncompensated options.
Finally, consider the problem any market faces when it tries to
accommodate both informed and uninformed traders. As mentioned above, it
is costlier to provide liquidity to informed traders than to uninformed traders
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because the market makers who provide liquidity face an adverse selection
problem. 6 Informed traders will want to buy when they have private
information that suggests that the security is underpriced, and vice versa.
Market makers, therefore, would want to quote a wide spread to informed
traders. Conventional analysis assumes that they cannot distinguish informed
from uninformed traders, and that they therefore quote identical spreads to
each.
More recent work, however, suggests that the specialist may be able to
distinguish to some extent informed traders from liquidity traders. Most
orders come to the specialist post from floor brokers, and the number of
specialists and floor brokers on the NYSE is sufficiently small that there are
repeated interactions between the same individuals.57 The floor broker knows
the identity of his customer and may often know the motive for the trade.
Although the specialist does not know ex ante whether a trade is informed, he
will frequently be able to infer it ex post (for example, when news is released
shortly after the trade). The specialist can use that knowledge to create
incentives for repeat-player floor brokers to share information about the
characteristics of their customer by cooperating more or less thoroughly with
the floor broker's attempts to gain favorable execution for his customers.
As Lawrence Benveniste, Alan Marcus and William Wilhelm
demonstrate, an equilibrium in which the specialist actively seeks to
distinguish informed from uninformed traders and to change the spread
accordingly can Pareto-dominate an equilibrium in which no such efforts are
made and a single spread is quoted to all traders." The reason for this
counterintuitive result is that the trading volume of liquidity traders is,
plausibly, assumed to be elastic with respect to trading costs. 9 The lower the
spread quoted to liquidity traders, the more such trades there will be. If we
further assume that the exchange implicitly or explicitly limits the profits of
the specialist, then the higher trading volume (and higher specialist profits)
generated by liquidity traders will enable the specialist to charge smaller
spreads to informed traders than in the pooled equilibrium.'
The specialist may, therefore, play a significant role in addition to
56. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
57. Lawrence M. Benveniste et al., What's Special About the Specialist?, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 61
(1992).
58. Id. at 61-62.
59. Id. at 64.
60. Id.
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providing liquidity and execution services. He may alleviate a potential
deadweight loss from informed trading (the liquidity trades that are deterred
by larger spreads) by acting as the enforcer of an informal agreement under
which informed traders as a group internalize that cost, to the long-term
benefit of all traders. If so, it is ironic; the specialist system has long been a
favorite target of reformers and was a particular focus of the securities statutes
of the 1930s. 6
1
Automated systems are, for the most part, designed to appeal to liquidity
traders rather than informed traders. As Lawrence Harris has noted, the
automated crossing networks are particularly attractive to patient, cost-
conscious traders. 62 As these networks grow, however, they may find that
they have no choice but to consider how to accommodate both liquidity and
informed traders. To the extent automated systems capture a substantial
amount of uninformed trading volume, they will increase the bid-ask spread
in the primary market.6' This, in turn, will encourage informed traders to use
the automated market whenever feasible and use the nonautomated market
only for those situations in which immediate trading is imperative. As a
result, liquidity sellers will find that the arrival of buyers (and, therefore, the
sellers' sales) tends to cluster in periods just before the release of favorable
information rather than being spread randomly. Liquidity traders, in other
words, will bear some of the adverse selection costs that drove them away
from exchanges in the first place. This will offset at least some of the cost
advantage of the automated market.
There is empirical support for the notion that informed traders try to use
automated networks when possible and that their attempts impose costs on
uninformed traders. A recent study of proprietary data from an institutional
participant in the Crossing Network found that the direction of order
imbalances in the Crossing Network is significantly correlated with the
direction of close-to-open price changes in the primary market, and also
found a significant relationship between the size of these imbalances and the
change in the bid-ask spread in the primary market the next day.' 4 In other
61. One can gain a feel for the deep suspicion with which Congress viewed the specialists by
reading the discussion in the Senate Banking Committee's report on the stock exchange hearings of
1932-34. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK EXCHANGE PRACTICES, S. REP.
No. 73-1455, at 23-28, 47-50 (1934).
62. See Harris, supra note 48, at 12-13.
63. See Ye, supra note 28.
64. See id.
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words, on evenings in which there are considerably more buy than sell orders
in the Crossing Network, the next morning's opening price in the primary
market tends to be higher than the prior day's close and vice versa, suggesting
that the imbalances reflect informed trading. Moreover, when these
imbalances are large, the bid-ask spread in the primary market increases,
suggesting that market makers in the primary market perceive increased
information risk.65
If exchanges have indeed found a way to make informed traders
internalize some of the costs they impose on other traders, then automated
networks will have to do the same in order to be fully competitive. Otherwise,
some or all of the reduced cost of execution will be offset by the more severe
adverse selection problem that uninformed traders in the automated networks
will suffer at the hands of informed traders. It may be that this problem has
limited the share of uninformed trading that PTSs can lure away from
exchanges and NASDAQ.
I do not intend this as a Luddite response to technological innovation in
securities markets. It is entirely possible that computerized trading systems
will come up with elegant and inexpensive ways of playing more (perhaps
all) of the roles human intermediaries play. My point is only that the fact that
these innovations have not yet come to pass does not necessarily reflect
successful interference by self-interested exchanges and exchange members
that requires an intrusive regulatory solution. It may reflect nothing more
complex than the fact that infiastructure innovations tend to occur gradually.66
IV. TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES
The SEC has devoted much money and effort, albeit in many fits and
starts, to the development of an electronic filing system. Its Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) system requires that many
securities filings be made electronically.67 The electronic filings can be
retrieved through the SEC's web site6' or through commercial providers such
65. Id.
66. Cf. Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, Financial Infrastructure and Public Policy, in THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: A FUNCTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 263,265-66 (1995).
67. See generally Regulation S-T, 17 C.F.R. §§ 232.10-.903 (1996) (outlining the requirements
for electronic filing).
68. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n, EDGAR Database of Corporate Information (visited Mar.
5, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov/edgarhp.htm>.
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as Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw.69
The justification for the system was partly to reduce the costs of filing and
expedite SEC review. However, the SEC also advocated the system as a
means of reducing the average investor's informational disadvantage relative
to securities professionals. Shortly after the SEC began its pilot electronic
filing program, then-Chairman John Shad argued that the pilot program "has
demonstrated the feasibility and multiple advantages of electronic
dissemination of time-sensitive corporate information.... Full disclosures by
corporations will be instantly available on home and office computer
screens."7 An SEC release similarly noted, "An important element of [the
EDGAR proposal] is that it affords all users of SEC data identical, immediate
access. There would be no competitive advantage based on time."'"
Commentators also focused on the system's potential to reduce informational
advantages. The concept resonates well with the widespread view, best
expressed by Joel Seligman, that the purpose of securities regulation is to
reduce or eliminate informational asymmetries between ordinary investors, on
the one hand, and issuers and securities professionals, on the other.7
A technological innovation that provided all traders with simultaneous
access to most firm-specific information would have enormous consequences
for market efficiency and the role of informed trading. If traders received
information simultaneously, prices could adjust without any trading because
traders would adjust their bid and ask prices to reflect the new information.
Accordingly, no one would earn a trading profit from the information.74 The
result would be to reduce the prevalence and importance of private
information relative to public information in securities markets.
The history of technological innovations, however, holds very little
promise that IT can create a world of homogeneously informed traders. In
fact, technology can as easily increase as decrease informational asymmetries.
Those who invest in improved communications technology can gather data
69. EDGAR SEC filings available in WESTLAW, EDGAR database, and in LEXIS, Fedsec
Library, Edgarp file.
70. John Shad, The SEC's Initiatives Aid Market, NAT'L L.J., June 30, 1986, at 21, 24.
71. Electronic Filing, Processing and Information Discrimination System, Securities Act Release
No. 33-6548,31 S.E.C. Docket 334,336 (Sept. 5, 1984).
72. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 1, at 757-59.
73. See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving
Structure ofFederal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 649 (1995).
74. See generally Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common Knowledge,
26 . ECON. THEORY 17 (1982).
[VOL. 75:815
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss2/5
TECHNOLOGY, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SECURITIES
more rapidly or from farther afield than those who are one or two steps
behind the cutting edge. By definition, the cutting edge of technology is only
cost-effective for a limited number of users, and technology can give those
users an informational head start.
The telegraph provides an excellent example. Prior to its invention, news
from outside London or New York reached those cities primarily through the
daily mail. The result was that security prices were not efficient with respect
to events that occurred in other cities until news of those events had time to
make the journey by horse or rail." The same, of course, was true of the
impact of trading in London or New York in other financial centers; the
prices set on the great exchanges did not reach other markets for days.
Nevertheless, there was little or no informational asymmetry with respect to
such news and prices because everyone received them at roughly the same
time.
76
Once the telegraph was invented, it became possible for some traders to
learn about events and prices outside their own region before the same
information arrived by mail. Security prices became more efficient, in the
sense that prices reflected a larger information set than before." At the same
time, the telegraph introduced significant informational asymmetries. Sending
telegraphs was expensive. Not surprisingly, major brokerage firms and
private banks were among the first heavy users of the telegraph." This meant,
however, that they had superior information compared to local traders who
were unwilling or unable to devote such substantial resources to gathering
information.
This new information gap gave a decisive edge in arbitrage between
securities traded in more than one market to those who were willing to invest
in the infrastructure necessary to move price information rapidly from trading
floor to telegraph station and back again.79 The consequences were dramatic.
For example, the average gap between the prices of securities traded in both
London and Glasgow narrowed substantially between 1846, one year before
75. R.C. MICHIE, THE LONDON AND NEW YORK STOCK ExCHANGES 1850-1914, at 7 (1987).
76. Id. at 7-8.
77. Id. at 8-10.
78. See ROBERT SOBEL, THE BIG BOARD: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK MARKET 52-53
(1965).
79. Even in the nineteenth century, there were many securities traded in more than one market.
MICHIE, supra note 75, at 3-7. Government bonds, which dominated stock market activity before this
century, were traded in many markets. Id. at 5-7, 171. Railroad securities were also often traded on
more than one exchange. Id. at 23, 186.
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the first telegraph line connected the two exchanges, and 1860, when a
reliable communication system was in place."0 A similar effect is evident
between the London and New York Stock Exchanges after the first trans-
Atlantic cable was laid in 1866.8" In each case the gap was closed through the
arbitrage profits of a group of traders rather than through universal and
simultaneous dissemination of prices from other markets.
In fact, when looking for systematic and universal effects of technology
on securities markets, one should look at arbitrage operations. Any innovation
that significantly reduces the cost or increases the speed of communication
from one market to another makes it feasible to profit from even smaller price
gaps. Technology has routinely opened up new avenues for traders to gather,
analyze and exploit information about price gaps between securities or
combinations of securities that should trade at the same price.
Computers have added a new dimension to arbitrage, because they can
communicate large amounts of information rapidly at low cost and
manipulate and analyze information at great speed. This makes arbitrage
possible not just between identical securities, but between identical cash
flows. For example, traders now continuously monitor relative prices in cash
and futures markets to profit from any disparities by trading baskets of
securities and index futures. Similarly, derivatives traders monitor the relative
prices of various interest rate swaps, treasury bonds, and treasury futures that
might sometimes be mispriced relative to one another, permitting a riskless
arbitrage profit.
This form of arbitrage-identifying bundles of assets that should produce
identical cash flows and eliminating price gaps between them-came into its
own with the advent of cheap computing power. It was also made possible by
another "technological" innovation in the form of improvements in our ability
to model the cash flows produced by different assets. Perhaps the central
innovation here was the Black-Scholes option pricing model.82 That model
proceeded from the simple insight that a call option can be thought of as a
combination of a long position in a stock and a short position in a risk-free
bond. Therefore, arbitrage should remove any price disparity between the
value of the option and the value of the stock-and-bond combination." This
80. MICHIE, supra note 75, at 7-10.
81. Id.at47-48.
82. See Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.
POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
83. Seeid. at638-39.
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arbitrage insight was also at the heart of Modigliani and Miller's path-
breaking work on capital structure, which preceded the Black-Scholes model
and played a similar role in educating economists and traders as to the
potential for splitting and recombining cash flows in ways that could meet the
disparate needs of different investors.84
The combination of the Black-Scholes insight and the dramatic increase in
computational capacity has produced an explosion in new financial products.
The traders who buy and sell swaps, options, futures, structured notes and
other exotica are performing largely the same function as an earlier
generation of traders who sprinted from a trading post to a telephone booth to
relay prices and orders to a counterpart in another city. Traders have always
tried to identify various combinations of assets that will produce the same
stream of cash and to profit by eliminating price disparities between them.
Advances in computer and communications technology, as well as in our
understanding of the price formation process, will open up still more
opportunities to find and profit from such price disparities. As the set of assets
that are fairly priced relative to one another expands, prices in financial
markets will better reflect underlying economic variables.
The greater informativeness of prices is not, however, a consequence of
simultaneous availability of information to every trader, rather, it is the
consequence of technology facilitating the rapid acquisition and use of
information by a small subset of traders. The same principle holds not merely
with respect to information about riskless arbitrage opportunities, but also
with respect to speculative information about the future returns on a particular
asset. Technology does not eliminate informational asymmetries directly.
Instead, technology enables informed traders to exhaust the profitmaking
potential of such asymmetries more rapidly than before.
The distinction has implications for the regulatory system. Were it
possible to create a world of homogeneously informed traders through the use
of technology, then technology would enable regulators to pursue seriously
the equality-of-information theory of securities regulation. A system like
EDGAR, if employed in connection with a system of continuous disclosure,
might drive out most trading that is motivated either by information or by the
mistaken belief that the trader has information. In a world of simultaneous
access to all "material facts," there is no opportunity for trading on firm-
84. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory oflnvestment, 48 AM. ECON. REv. 261 (1958).
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specific information. Such a result could be beneficial were there excessive
investment in information for the purpose of making trading profits or were
trading on mistaken or irrational beliefs an important source of social cost.
8
Yet one would also expect that those traders near the top of the informational
hierarchy would strongly resist a challenge to their informational advantage,
making it a tough fight for the regulators.
This is not, however, an accurate picture of the post-technological
regulatory world. Barring advances in IT considerably more revolutionary
than those seen to date, IT is not a plausible substitute for informed trading as
an engine of stock price efficiency. This is surely one reason for the plodding
pace of development of the EDGAR system.86 It is difficult to generate a real
sense of urgency for a system that replaces massive amounts of paper
containing information that is already reflected in prices with massive
amounts of downloadable text and graphics containing information that is
already reflected in prices.
It is ironic that the SEC raised the prospect of EDGAR's leveling the
informational playing field. Not long before the EDGAR pilot project, the
SEC had implicitly accepted a very different paradigm, in which most
investors free ride on information acquired by informed investors rather than
compete for the same information. In the early 1980s, the SEC unveiled its
Integrated Disclosure System, a package of regulatory innovations that,
among other things, permits larger companies to register securities for sale
using an abbreviated registration statement and prospectus that incorporate by
reference material already contained in the company's periodic filings.87 Prior
to the integrated disclosure system, a company that had recently filed a Form
10-K describing its business and finances in great detail would have to repeat
the information in a prospectus if it engaged in a public offering. The
integrated disclosure system also facilitated a related innovation, shelf
registration, under which larger issuers could register a quantity of securities
for sale on a continuous basis without the need for individual registration of
each offering. 88
85. For arguments that trading motivated by incorrect beliefs is a substantial source of social
loss, see J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703
(1990); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995).
86. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
87. Short Form for the Registration of Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 33-5923, 14 S.E.C.
Docket 695 (1978) [hereinafter Integrated Disclosure System adopting release].
88. See Securities Act Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1996).
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One could have explained the change without any resort to the language
of technology and resultant increases in market efficiency. Any investor
diligent enough to read a prospectus with care and to make an investment
decision based on it would probably be willing and able to acquire a copy of
the 10-K as well. Thus, eliminating duplication would not pose a substantial
barrier to investors' obtaining the information they desire, but it would save
issuers money and effort-regardless of the state of communication
technology.
The SEC chose to use a more sweeping justification. It argued that given
advances in technology that facilitated retrieval of previously filed
information, one could be reasonably confident that the information contained
in prior reports was known to analysts and therefore was reflected in the price
of the company's stock. 9 Consistent with this idea, the abbreviated
registration forms are available only to larger, seasoned companies that are
generally followed by analysts. 9° As to these companies, technology
contributes to market efficiency by enabling informed traders rapidly to make
the market price a good indicator of the information contained in prior filings.
Thus, investors should be in as good a position as if they possessed that
information, even if they in fact never read it.
The ideas that prompted the integrated disclosure system are striking in
two respects. One is that the SEC did not claim (as it soon would in the
EDGAR context) that technology had made or could enable all investors to
be informed in the sense of knowing the contents of the company's prior
filings. Instead, it acknowledged that once informed traders had that
information, the stock price would be efficient with respect to it At that point
an average (uninformed) investor could not be harmed if he lacked the
information and was trading with someone who had it The second
remarkable aspect is that in adopting the integrated disclosure system the SEC
tacitly recognized the deregulatory impact of technology, as it would do in its
later responses to globalization, such as Rule 144A9' and Regulation S.92
89. Integrated Disclosure System adopting release, supra note 87, at 697.
90. For example, Form S-3, the most abbreviated registration form, can be used to register
common stock only if the issuer has a public float exceeding $75 million; the form also requires that
the issuer be a reporting company. SEC Form S-3, General Instruction I, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Regs. & Forms
(CCH) 8061, at 7182 (1995).
91. Securities Act Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1996).
92. Securities Act Regulation S, 17 C.F.Rt §§ 230.901-.904 (1996).
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V. TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION
The deregulatory pressure that technology will create is worth further
attention. Although I have argued that reductions in the cost of manipulating
and communicating information are not likely to have a substantial direct
impact on securities regulation,93 they do have the potential to expose the
fault lines in the regulatory system. In this respect, IT resembles the other
great modernizing force in securities markets, globalization.
As the combination of technology and globalization creates new choices
for investors, some of which are outside the coverage of the U.S. regulatory
system, regulators will increasingly receive feedback from markets indicating
which elements of the regulatory system add value and which do not.
Investors' decisions to risk or not risk money in particular foreign markets
will convey important information about the value of the extensive
protections afforded by U.S. law. Similarly, the use of technology to create
new products and new markets that fall outside particular regulatory
restrictions will give insights into how much investors value those
restrictions.94
Investors' growing tendency to opt out of the U.S. regulatory system is
creating a crisis of confidence for that system. Dean Seligman's choice of
Gotterdimmerung as a metaphor for the Securities Act is therefore not
farfetched.95 One might conclude that technology and low barriers to the
movement of capital will challenge the very survival of U.S. securities law.
Alternatively, securities regulators, like Briinnhilde, may acquire wisdom but
respond by moderating their ambitions rather than riding into the flames.
The equality-of-information paradigm treats securities law as a form of
consumer protection law.96 The underlying philosophy is that ordinary
investors are at a severe informational disadvantage with respect to issuers
and market professionals and are insufficiently sophisticated to recognize the
magnitude of their disadvantage and to discount the value of securities
93. See supra Part IV.
94. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in
CYBERSPACE: INFORMATION POLICY AND THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 129 (Brian
Kahin & Charles Nesson, eds., 1996).
95. See Joel Seligman, G6tterdammerungfor the Securities Act?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 887 (1997).
96. The tendency of some commentators to refer to the Securities Act as the "Truth in Securities"
law is a deliberate link to consumer protection law. See, e.g., Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities"
Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966).
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offered them accordingly.97 As such, they must both be given disclosures and
barred from waiving the protections the regulatory system gives them.
This rationale implies that the SEC should strongly resist issuers' and
investors' attempts to avoid regulatory costs through unregistered offerings or
offerings that require reduced disclosure. The SEC has taken precisely the
opposite tack through innovations like the integrated disclosure system, shelf
registration, the expansion of small-issue and private placement exemptions,
Rule 144A, and Regulation S. The traditional registration model involving a
one-shot offering and a lengthy, comprehensive prospectus is now the
exception rather than the rule. A substantial portion of securities offerings
takes place with voluntary rather than mandatory disclosures through
unregistered private placements and offshore offerings.
These developments reflect the SEC's desire to assure that the regulatory
costs associated with using the U.S. securities markets are not so substantial
as to drive issuers and investors elsewhere-whether "elsewhere' means
London or cyberspace. Let me ignore the much-debated question whether this
process reflects a destructive "race for the bottom" or a virtuous "race for the
top."98 Instead, I want to make a descriptive claim about where the process is
likely to go, while admitting (in the interest of full disclosure) that I find the
destination normatively attractive.
Rather than pursuing the unrealistic goal of eliminating informational
asymmetries, securities regulation is moving toward a more modest goal of
facilitating transactions despite informational asymmetries. Thus, securities
97. The question whether investors can rationally estimate the losses they suffer as a
consequence of insufficient disclosure is at the heart of the well-known debate between George Stigler
and his critics Irwin Friend and Edward Herman. See George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the
Securities Market, 37 J. BUS. 117 (1964); Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a
Glass Darkly, 37 J. BUS. 382 (1964). Stigler presented evidence that the returns on new issues prior to
the Securities Act were comparable to those after the Act. Friend and Herman countered that the
variance of returns had decreased and argued that that change was consistent with the Act having
improved the information available to investors. Friend and Herman must therefore assume that prior
to 1933, investors systematically accepted returns that were insufficient in relation to the associated
risks. Indeed, they argue as much:
In the earlier period, enormous losses were absorbed by the public in excessively leveraged, highly
speculative, and frequently manipulated new issues ... sold under disclosure conditions bordering
on fraud.
Id.
98. Pieces of that debate appear in a chapter entitled "National Autonomy Versus International
Cooperation" in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: ISSUES AND PoLIcIEs (Franklin
R. Edwards & Hugh T. Patrick eds. 1992). A good summary and extension appears in Stephen J. Choi
& Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market,
65 FORDHAML. REV. 1855 (1997).
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regulation can be best understood not as a species of consumer protection
law, but instead as a species of contract and agency law, which are similarly
concerned with facilitating trade under conditions of asymmetric information
but do so largely through default rules that the parties can alter contractually
to suit their preferences. In order to maximize the number of wealth-creating
transactions, the regulatory system will have to pay particular attention to
how its rules establish and enforce property rights in information. The rules of
securities markets-covering internal structure, disclosure obligations, market
integrity, and fiduciary duties of agents to their principals, among others -
allocate legal entitlements to information. Because market participants are
increasingly able to contract around undesired allocations, regulators cannot
insist on equal entitlements in all cases.
The SEC has experience in shifting from an equality-of-information
approach to a property rights approach in response to external pressure,
having made that move in its insider trading enforcement program. The SEC
first articulated its theory that Rule lOb-5 prohibits insider trading in the
Cady, Roberts administrative enforcement action" and then tested the theory
in court in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case.' In those cases, the SEC argued that
the policy objective of Rule lOb-5 was to equalize access to information.
When the Supreme Court rejected that objective as inconsistent with section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act in the Chiarella and Dirks cases,' the
SEC promptly adopted a new theory of Rule lOb-5 liability for insider
trading. Under the misappropriation theory, insider trading is harmful and
illegal not because the insider is at an informational advantage, but because
the insider violated someone else's property right in the information.0 2
To what extent will technology cause similar regulatory paradigm shifts? I
have identified a regulatory area-mandatory disclosure-in which
technology is unlikely to upset the existing allocation of property rights in
information because most market participants seem happy with the existing
allocation. Publicly traded companies are comfortable with the idea that
historical data about the company's financial performance "belongs" to the
investing public, and the investing public seems comfortable with the idea
that most forward-looking information "belongs" to the company and may be
99. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
100. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
101. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
102. See United States v. O'Hagan, _ U.S. _ (1997) (upholding the misappropriation theory
as consistent with section 10(b)).
[VCOL. 75:815
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss2/5
TECHNOLOGY, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SECURITIES
concealed for the shareholders' benefit Despite the "full disclosure" rhetoric,
in other words, the disclosure system already reflects an implicit bargain
between issuers and investors regarding the allocation of firm-specific
information. Those companies that require even greater secrecy and can
convince investors that secrecy is wealth-maximizing can opt out of the
mandatory disclosure system through the many exemptions the SEC has
recognized.
103
This is not to say that the mandatory disclosure system will not change at
all. Although the SEC's disclosure requirements impose an acceptably low
cost on domestic companies, they are much more costly for foreign
companies because of the accounting requirements that go with the disclosure
system.'" This has led the NYSE, which competes for international listings,
particularly with the London Stock Exchange, to propose relaxing accounting
requirements for foreign issuers listed on U.S. exchanges."0 5 Over time, the
growing internationalization of markets will create pressure for a more
flexible disclosure system, perhaps one designed and enforced principally by
exchanges rather than governmental regulators.' °  The dispute, however, .is
less about the allocation of a property right in information than it is about the
SEC's and NYSE's differing beliefs about the informational content of U.S.
accounting statements compared to foreign accounting statements.
Automated trading systems, by contrast, are an area in which technology
may undercut an existing allocation of property rights in information.
Consistent with the equality-of-information paradigm, the SEC's attitude has
generally been that the more information disclosed by organized exchanges
and other markets about transactions and orders, the better. The SEC has thus
identified "transparency," or equalization of information about prices,
quotations, volumes, orders, and similar information, as a key regulatory goal.
A central purpose of the National Market System is to increase transparency
by making price and quotation information from each market available to
participants in all other markets. Part of the SEC's Market 2000 study was
devoted to a call for still greater transparency and recommendations for
103. See, e.g., Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 - .508 (series of safe harbor exemptions for
limited offerings); Regulation S. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901 - .904 (series of safe harbor exemptions for
offshore offerings).
104. See Franklin R. Edwards, Listing of Foreign Securities on U.S. Exchanges, 5 J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 28 (1993).
105. Seeid. at30.
106. See Mahoney, supra note 4.
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achieving it. 107
Yet the desire of markets and their participants to maintain the secrecy of
some transaction and order information is not per se inefficient. Increasing
transparency may not always increase investor welfare. For markets of
moderate size and liquidity, greater disclosure of the non-price components of
orders may reduce liquidity and increase price volatility.'0 8 A trader's
disclosure of information that might enable others to infer motivation and
trading strategy can cause the trades to be at less favorable prices. Too much
transparency can therefore reduce the incentive to gather information or
provide liquidity. °9 Market participants, therefore, likely view transparency
as an aspect of system design. Some markets might choose more, some might
choose less, but unless one market's choice interferes with another's there is
no obvious reason for the regulatory system to override those choices.
The Market 2000 report formally rejects all claims that less transparency
is ever preferable."' In reality, however, the SEC's desire to achieve full
transparency is already being tempered by the recognition that many investors
wish to control the dissemination of information about their orders. The
discussion of PTSs earlier in this Article noted that investors are drawn to
these automated systems not solely by reduced execution costs."' Part of the
PTSs' attraction comes from their greater ability to keep secret the size and
other non-price characteristics of customer orders. The SEC's decision not to
regulate PTSs as exchanges helps them to maintain that secrecy.
As this Article went to press, the SEC was considering ending this hands-
off approach in order to force the larger automated trading systems to disclose
more information about orders." 2 To the extent automated systems can no
longer keep orders confidential, however, large investors who value secrecy
will seek other alternatives, such as offshore trading. The SEC appreciates
that risk, because its concept release on the regulation of secondary markets
also identifies U.S. investors' trading on foreign markets as an area of
concern. Indeed, it suggests that, in order to force greater transparency, the
SEC may assert regulatory jurisdiction over entities that provide U.S.
107. MARKEr2000, supra note 37, at 17-21, IV-1 to -19.
108. See Madhavan, supra note 53, at 264-71.
109. See J. Harold Mulherin, Market Transparency: Pros, Cons, and Property Rights, J. APPLIED
CoRP. FIN., winter 1993, at 94.
110. MARKEr 2000, supra note 37, at IV-4.
S111. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
112. See Concept Release, supra note 35.
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investors with access to foreign markets. The political barriers to such a
move, however, will be high. Foreign markets will view it as an attempt by
the SEC to externalize the cost of its regulations so as to reduce the
competitive disadvantages those regulations impose on U.S. markets.
The SEC's most unyielding stance on transparency relates to the prices
and volumes of completed transactions rather than the details of unexecuted
orders. This may be appropriate because the welfare argument for full
transparency of completed transactions is stronger than the case for full
transparency of the components of order flow."3 Even here, however, the
SEC will have to confront the desire of some traders to trade with reduced
transparency. The consolidated tape that records all transactions in National
Market System securities operates only during normal trading hours.114 A
growing number of transactions occurs after the U.S. markets have closed,
however, either through crossing networks or overseas markets. The Market
2000 report calls for greater transparency with respect to these trades." 5
Nevertheless, some large trades are likely made after hours because the
purchasing dealer believes, correctly or incorrectly, that immediate disclosure
of the trade will make it harder for the dealer to "unwind" (sell off) the
position at favorable prices. The London Stock Exchange's attempts to deal
with this very issue have caused heated debate for the past decade," 6 and a
push for full transparency of after-hours trading in the United States will
probably also cause a sharp debate over how to allocate the property right in
information relating to a completed trade.
My conclusion, then, is that we are in the middle of a gradual evolution in
the SEC's and the academy's thinking about the purposes of securities
regulation." 7 The consumer protection, equality-of-information theory of
securities regulation has suffered blows at the hands of the Supreme Court
and market participants armed with technology and the relatively free
movement of capital. A plausible endpoint of this evolution is a regulatory
113. See generally Madhavan, supra note 53.
114. See MARKET 2000, supra note 37, at IV-13 to -14.
115. Id.
116. See Madhavan, supra note 53, at 255-56.
117. Bruce Johnsen argues that soft dollar brokerage, a practice in which brokers bundle the cost
of investment research and execution for money managers, reflects a preferred allocation of property
rights to investment research. See D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights to Investment Research: The
Agency Costs fSoft Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 75 (1994). If so, the increasing regulatory
suspicion of soft dollar brokerage is a counterexample to the general trend I have noted. On the other
hand, Johnsen's treatment of the issue is part of a growing trend in academic thinking to consider
property rights explanations for securities industry practices that are unpopular with policymakers.
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system that focuses on two core missions. One is to combat fraud and
breaches of fiduciary or contractual duties, each of which often amounts to a
theft of someone else's information. The second is to set clear rules that
enable market participants to recognize where informational asymmetries
exist and to adjust valuations accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
Information technology and securities markets go hand in hand. The
pieces of paper or entries in a computer that represent claims to some of the
cash generated by a business present relatively modest problems of storage
and transportation. Thus, the important barriers to trading those claims are the
dispersion of information about their value and of potential trading partners.
Information technology has dramatically reduced both barriers over the past
two centuries and will likely continue to do so.
The regulatory problems that this trade generates, however, are more
durable. The mobility of securities and their salesmen make them attractive
vehicles for fraud. The degree of specialization in securities markets creates a
web of agency relationships with their attendant conflicts. In order to facilitate
a high volume of transactions, securities markets require a high degree of
organization, including a body of rules and procedures.
Technology has only modest implications for these regulatory issues. It
will, however, cast a harsh light on the equality-of-information rationale that
constitutes the intellectual backbone, if not always the practical reality, of
securities regulation. Regulators may gradually be recognizing that this
rhetoric confuses rather than clarifies the issues raised by new technologies
and the growing interconnection of markets. It may therefore be time to return
to first principles. Informational asymmetries are neither inherently bad nor
inherently good; their character depends on the extent to which they
encourage or discourage socially desirable transactions and investments in
socially valuable information. To the extent technology causes regulators to
analyze those issues rather than the feasibility of ever more disclosure, it will
provide an unintended benefit.
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